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地区增长联盟与中国特色的 政商关系. (Chinese)

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  • Additional Information
    • Alternate Title:
      Local Growth Coalition and the Government-Business Relations: Chinese Style. (English)
    • Subject Terms:
    • Abstract:
      This paper aims to develop an analytical framework that characterizes China’s unique government-business relations during the reform era. The focus is on the relationship between the government and non-state enterprises, manifested primarily at the local level due to the unique block-line administrative system in China. These relations are shaped by two co-existing competitions: the political competition by officials in bureaucracy and the economic competition by businessmen in market. The result is a political achievement-commercial performance nexus: the mutually beneficial exchange between political achievements (desired by local officials) and commercial performances(desired by private entrepreneurs). On the one hand, due to the intensity of the competition in both politics and economy, this relational nexus is performance- oriented, open-ended, and contractual, similar to the typical market exchanges. However, on the other hand, it is also driven by personalized political incentives(or career concerns) of local officials and supported by the mutual trust between local officials and private business owners. In this sense, China’s government-business relations are characterized by a mixing and matching of institutionalization (such as performance orientation, openness, and contractibility) and personalization (such as personalized career concerns and mutual trust) . It is in a stark contrast with the clearly- defined, rule-based, and transparent relations in the western countries, or the traditional kinship or clan-based relationships prevalent in developing countries, or other special interests based patron-client relationships. Nevertheless, the political achievement-commercial performance nexus is affected in scope and strength by the political hierarchy of local officials and the interregional mobility of private enterprises. As a result, a multi-facet, multi-level and multi-dimensional local growth alliance and a government-business complex are formed and centered around the political achievement-commercial performance nexus between local bureaucrats and private business owners. Overall, the Chinese style performance-oriented government-business relations have provided a pro-private business environment and thus have served as a quasi-institutionalized basis for the rise of private business and China’s rapid growth during the reform era while the nation-level legal protection for private business has remained insufficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
      本文旨在提供一个分析框架,刻画改革开放时期中国独具特色的政商 关系。政府与非国有企业之间的关系主要体现在地区层面,在“官场+市场”双 重竞争机制驱动下,结成“政绩—业绩”纽带,并以此为中心形成制度化和人格 化双重特征“混搭”的关系。这区别于英美等西方国家政企之间边界分明、规则 清晰的制度化关系,以及发展中国家常见的基于血缘、地缘等传统社会网络的 人情关系,也区别于狭隘互利的政治庇护关系。在一个地区内部,随着官场晋 升流动性和企业跨地区流动性的变化, 政绩—业绩纽带的强度在不同层级的 政府官员与不同规模的企业之间也相应发生变化, 由此形成了多面向、多层 次、多维度的地区增长联盟和政商综合体。中国特色的政商关系在总体上弥补 了长期以来国家层面对于民营企业制度化保障之不足, 为中国的高速经济增 长提供了重要的准制度基础。 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
    • Abstract:
      Copyright of Society: Chinese Journal of Sociology / Shehui is the property of Society: Chinese Journal of Sociology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)