This article reviews the strategic delegation literature and provides a theoretical framework that integrates this perspective into management research. The strategic delegation literature is built on the observation that, under strategic interdependence, delegation of decision making and accompanying actions can serve as commitments that influence competitive interactions with rivals and lead to beneficial outcomes. In this article, the authors first integrate diverse models and streams of research on strategic delegation in an organizing framework and highlight points of agreement and departure. This is the first comprehensive review of formal game-theoretical research purporting to show the strategic effects of delegation. The authors then integrate strategic delegation into strategic management and organization theory research in three main ways: They propose a common set of assumptions that would attune the strategic delegation perspective with other views and make it more relevant for management research, they outline ways in which the strategic delegation perspective can be linked to a set of theories of management, and finally they point out additional empirical research avenues that can exploit interindustry heterogeneity, intraindustry heterogeneity, and international differences in delegation instruments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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